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WHEN A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IS NO LONGER
PEREMPTORY: BATSON'S UNFORTUNATE FAILURE TO
ERADICATE INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION FROM JURY
SELECTION
Jere W. Morehead*
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process
by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead
the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system.'
INTRODUCTION
In Batson v. Kentucky,2 the Supreme Court declared that the use
of peremptory challenges3 by prosecutors in criminal cases to ex-
clude jurors on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Batson, a prosecutor
used peremptory challenges to strike four African-Americans from
the jury so that the defendant, also an African-American, was tried
by an all-white jury.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson has sparked considerable
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, University of
Georgia. Prior to joining the Georgia faculty, Professor Morehead served as an Assistant United
States Attorney in the Department of Justice, where he prosecuted white-collar crime.
1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. A peremptory challenge has been defined as "[t]he right to challenge a juror without as-
signing, or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136
(6th ed. 1990). Generally, once a jury venire has been gathered, each side in a given case is
allowed two kinds of challenges: an unlimited number of challenges "for cause," for which a basis
must be articulated to and accepted by the trial judge; and a limited number of peremptory chal-
lenges, for which no reason at all must be provided. See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA
49 (1988); JoN M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 139-40 (1977).
4. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-84. In writing for the Court's majority, Justice Lewis Powell ob-
served that "[tlhe Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable
impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." Id. at 89.
5. Id. at 82. The trial judge in Batson had observed "that the parties were entitled to use their
peremptory challenges to 'strike anybody they want to.' " Id.
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scholarly interest and debate.6 The Court has expanded its holding
in Batson to protect all defendants of a different racial classification
than that of the excluded juror as well as to ban discriminatory pe-
remptory challenges by civil litigants and criminal defendants.7
6. Over the past several years, a myriad of academic articles have scrutinized the various ques-
tions left unresolved by Batson and its progeny. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U.
Cm. L. REV. 153 (1989) (discussing three Supreme Court decisions regarding the jury and the
selection process); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory
Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in A Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808 (1989)
(discussing whether a defendant should have limited peremptory challenges); Susan N. Herman,
Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67
TUL. L. REV. 1807 (1993) (finding that the courts must do more to eradicate racism in the crimi-
nal justice system); Bonnie L. Mayfield, Batson and Groups Other Than Blacks: A Strict Scru-
tiny Analysis, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 377 (1988) (discussing the possibility of extending strict
scrutiny review to jury selection procedures); Jere W. Morehead, Exploring the Frontiers of Bat-
son v. Kentucky: Should the Safeguards of Equal Protection Extend to Gender?, 14 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 289 (1990) [hereinafter Morehead, Exploring the Frontiers] (arguing in support of ex-
tending Batson's holding to prohibit the gender-based use of peremptory challenges); Jere W.
Morehead, Prohibiting Race-Based Peremptory Challenges: Should the Principle of Equal Pro-
tection Be Extended to Private Litigants?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 833 (1991) [hereinafter Morehead,
Private Litigants] (advocating the use of the peremptory challenge in civil cases); Jere W.
Morehead, Racism in Jury Selection: A Response to Pryor, 22 CuMB. L. REV. 269 (1992) [here-
inafter Morehead, Racism in Jury Selection] (supporting a greater protection against jury dis-
crimination); Robert M. O'Connell, The Elimination of Racism From Jury Selection: Challeng-
ing the Peremptory Challenge, 32 B.C. L. REV. 433 (1991) (supporting the proposition that
peremptory challenges cannot be used on racial or ethnic grounds); William H. Pryor, Applying
Batson in Civil Trials: The Greatest Sideshow on Earth, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 49 (1991) (opposing
an expansion of Batson's protection to civil cases); J. Alexander Tanford, Racism in the Adver-
sary System: The Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1015 (1990)
(arguing for the elimination of a defendant's racially-motivated use of peremptory challenges);
Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right is It, Any-
way?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992) (explaining how jury discrimination harms the jurors rather
than the defendant); Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of
Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517 (1992) (arguing for the elimination of the pe-
remptory challenge altogether); Dave Harbeck, Comment, Eliminating Unconstitutional Juries:
Applying United States v. De Gross to All Heightened Scrutiny Equal Protection Groups in the
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 77 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme
Court should prohibit peremptory challenges for all groups that receive heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause); Robert L. Harris, Jr., Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptory
Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027 (1991) (focusing on the need to protect any qualified
juror from discrimination); Michael M. Raeber, Note, Toward an Integrated Rule Prohibiting
All Race-Based Peremptory Challenges: Some Considerations on Georgia v. McCollum, 26 GA.
L. REV. 503 (1992) (arguing for an extension of the Batson principle to criminal defendants);
Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the '7ntu-
itive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 336 (1993) (arguing that an attorney's reasons
for using a peremptory challenge should be able to be objectively verified by the juror's own
statements during voir dire).
7. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant is
prohibited from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding that the Batson
rule applies to both plaintiffs and defendants in civil trials); Hernandez v. New York, I ll S. Ct.
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Clarifying the extent of Batson's reach has become an almost an-
nual event for the Supreme Court. The Court held just this term
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the ba-
sis of gender in jury selection.'
This Article summarizes the evolution of the peremptory chal-
lenge from the common law of England to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Batson in 1986. The Article then reviews the recent expan-
sion of Batson by the Court in several subsequent cases and
considers the growth and permutation of innumerable problems as-
sociated with attempts to eradicate invidious discrimination from
the jury selection process. Finally, this Article analyzes the argu-
ments in favor of a broader remedy to combat the problems created
by discrimination in jury selection: an integrated rule proscribing
the use of peremptory challenges in selecting juries.9 Such a rule, by
its very nature, would provide equality for all parties before a court
and, at the same time, provide greater efficiency in the judicial
system.
I. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The peremptory challenge has been around for centuries. 10 In the
initial days of jury trials in England, a defendant was permitted
thirty-five peremptory challenges in felony trials," and the Crown
1859 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude Latino jurors
does not violate Batson when exercised on the race-neutral basis of governmental uncertainty that
the challenged jurors will accept official translations of witness testimony); Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that criminal defendants have standing to object to the racially-moti-
vated use of peremptory challenges regardless of the race of the defendant or the excluded juror).
8. J.E.B. v. State ex rel T.B., No. 92-1239, 1994 WL 132232, at *2 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1994).
J.E.B. involved the state's use of peremptory strikes to eliminate men from the venire in paternity
actions. The defendant used all but one of his peremptory strikes to eliminate women from the
venire. Id. The use of gender-based peremptory challenges has not been an issue until recently.
Indeed, the Supreme Court expressed approval of all-male juries in Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880), and the great majority of states continued to exclude women from
juries even after they were granted the right to vote in 1920. See Carol Weisbrod, Images of the
Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 60 n.5 (1986). The last state law barring women from
juries was not repealed until 1968. Susan L. McCoin, Note, Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire
Process: The Rights of Prospective Female Jurors, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225, 1243 (1985).
9. This author first broached the idea of eliminating peremptory challenges, albeit in a cursory
manner, in Morehead, Private Litigants, supra note 6, at 840-41, 848.
10. A detailed history of the development of the peremptory challenge in both England and the
United States can be found in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-20 (1965), overruled by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In his dissenting opinion in Batson, Chief Justice War-
ren Burger traced the peremptory challenge as far back as 104 B.C. Batson, 476 U.S. at 119
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
11. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-13.
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was effectively permitted to hand-pick the jury.12 In 1305, Parlia-
ment chose to eliminate the Crown's right to use peremptory chal-
lenges.1 3 Although the accused retained the authority to use pe-
remptory challenges in England, that practice became largely
extinct in criminal cases 4 and was never developed at all in civil
cases.
15
In contrast, the peremptory challenge in the United States has
prospered. In 1790 - just three short years after the Constitution
was approved - Congress statutorily granted federal defendants
thirty-five peremptory challenges in cases involving treason and
twenty in other cases punishable by death.1 " In the years that fol-
lowed, many courts began to permit peremptory challenges by both
the defendant and the government for other offenses as well.'" Sub-
sequently, in 1865, the government was granted five peremptory
challenges in capital and treason cases while a defendant's number
was reduced to twenty.18 Shortly thereafter, in 1872, Congress ex-
tended a defendant's right in all noncapital felony cases to ten chal-
lenges and allowed the government three challenges. 19
Under current federal law, when the charged offense is a felony, a
defendant is entitled to ten peremptory challenges and the govern-
ment is allotted six.20 Three peremptory challenges are also provided
for both sides in federal civil cases.2' The formation of individual
state practice has closely followed the federal contour; 22 every state
has developed a jury selection procedure that includes the use of
peremptory challenges by both sides. 3
12. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 147.
13. Id. (citing the Ordinance for Inquests Statute, 33 Edw. Stat. 4 (1305)). The Crown's attor-
neys are still able to remove jurors without cause by the using the judicially-created doctrine
known as "standing aside." Raeber, supra note 6, at 509 n.28 (citing VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at
148). However, the practice of removing jurors by this or any other procedure has fallen into
disuse. See Regina v. Sheffield Crown Court, ex parte Brownlow, 1980 Q.B. 530, 542 (Eng. C.A.)
(noting that English courts no longer allow prosecutors to ask potential jurors to "stand by for the
Crown," or remove themselves from service).
14. Swain, 380 U.S. at 218.
15. WILLIAM R. CORNISH, THE JURY 45 (1968).
16. Swain, 380 U.S. at 214 (citing the Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 119).
17. Raeber, supra note 6, at 509 (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 214).
18. Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-15 (citing the Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500).
19. Id. at 215 n.14 (citing 17 Stat. 282 (1872)).
20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
22. Swain, 380 U.S. at 215.
23. See Clara L. Meek, Note, The Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Blacks From
Petit Juries in Civil Actions: The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes, 4 REv. LITIG. 175, 216-
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II. BATSON AND ITS PROGENY
In Batson, the Supreme Court acknowledged that racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection violates both a defendant's fundamental
right to equal protection and the excluded juror's prerogative to
serve on a jury regardless of skin color.24 The Court devised a
method to eliminate this problem by establishing a three-part prima
facie test to evaluate claims of racial discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges. The test requires the defendant to show: (1)
that the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2)
that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove venire
members of the defendant's race; and (3) that the relevant evidence
raised an inference of racial discrimination by the prosecutor.15
Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the prosecutor to present race-neutral reasons for the peremptory
strikes under review.28
Batson was followed by four other Supreme Court decisions on
the use of discriminatory peremptory challenges: Powers v. Ohio,21
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,28 Hernandez v. New York,29
and Georgia v. McCollum.3" In Powers, the Court expanded the
second prong of the Batson test, holding that all criminal defend-
ants have standing to object to the racially-motivated use of pe-
19 (1984).
24. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). "The very idea of a jury is a body ...
composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to deter-
mine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society
as that which he holds." Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
"Batson represented a determined effort by the Court to prevent actions aimed at striking black
venire-persons based on the misguided opinion that blacks, as a group, are unfit to serve as ju-
rors." Morehead, Racism in Jury Selection, supra note 6, at 270.
25. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 97. The Court held:
[T]he prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a chal-
lenge for cause. . . . But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie
case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's
race on the assumption - or his intuitive judgment - that they would be partial to
the defendant because of their shared race.
Id.
27. 499 U.S. 400 (1991); see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing the decision
in Powers).
28. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); see supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (detailing the
Court's decision in Edmonson).
29. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); see supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's opinion in Hernandez).
30. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (describing the hold-
ing in McCollum).
1994]
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remptory challenges by the prosecutor, regardless of whether the de-
fendant and the challenged juror share the same race."' The Court
observed that the "Fourteenth Amendment's mandate that race dis-
crimination be eliminated from all official acts and proceedings of
the State is most compelling in the judicial system."3 2 The Court's
7-2 opinion was severely criticized by Justice Antonin Scalia in his
dissent over the Court's decision to depart from its prior holdings,
which had permitted an equal protection challenge only when the
stricken juror was of a different race than the defendant.3"
In Edmonson, the Court further extended Batson's protection to
civil trials involving private parties represented by private attorneys,
holding that a private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race.3 To justify
the Court's application of the constitutional equal protection doc-
trine, the Court held that the state action requirement was satisfied
by finding that a private party "becomes a government actor for the
limited purpose of using peremptories during jury selection." 35 This
6-3 decision, expectedly, resulted in two stinging dissenting opinions:
one written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who argued that
"[tihe Government is not responsible for everything that occurs in a
courtroom"; 6 and the other by Justice Scalia, who added that the
ruling would also prove to be a hindrance to the minority litigants it
was intended to benefit.
In Hernandez, the Court confronted both the sufficiency of a
31. Powers, 499 U.S. at 409-10. The Court noted: "To bar petitioner's claim because his race
differs from that of the excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens
from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury service." Id. at 415.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 417-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted:
Until Batson, our jurisprudence affirmed the categorical validity of peremptory strikes
so long as they were not used as a substitute for segregated jury lists. Batson made an
exception, but one that was narrow in principle and hence limited in effect. It an-
nounced an equal-protection right, not of prospective jurors to be seated without re-
gard to their race, but of defendants not to be tried by juries from which members of
their race have been intentionally excluded.
Id. at 425 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991). Prior to the Edmonson
decision, this author had urged the same result in Morehead, Private Litigants, supra note 6.
35. Edmonson, III S. Ct. at 2086. The Court held that "[tihe selection of jurors represents a
unique governmental function delegated to private litigants by the government and attributable to
the government for purposes of invoking constitutional protections against discrimination by rea-
son of race." Id. The Court thus found that state action was present.
36. Id. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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prosecutor's excuse for using peremptory challenges and the fate of
facially neutral peremptory challenges that have a disproportionate
impact upon a particular racial group. On the latter point the Court
found that a prosecutor's peremptory challenges are not discrimina-
tory simply because they might have a disproportionate impact on a
racial group.38 Instead, intent or purposeful discrimination is neces-
sary for a successful Batson challenge.39 With regard to the suffi-
ciency of the excuse offered by the prosecutor for her challenge, the
Court noted that the issue of discriminatory intent will "largely turn
on [an] evaluation of credibility"4 with respect to the explanation
offered by counsel. 1
Finally, in McCollum, the Court enlarged Batson's grasp to pro-
hibit the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by criminal
defendants.42 The Court followed the analysis previously used in Ed-
monson43 and concluded that a defendant's right to a fair trial does
not permit the utilization of a peremptory challenge "based on ei-
ther the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the
party." 4 Justices O'Connor and Scalia once again dissented, largely
on the question of state action, with Justice Scalia sarcastically
ridiculing the majority's conclusion that "[a] criminal defendant, in
the process of defending himself against the state, is held to be act-
ing on behalf of the state. 45
38. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1867 (1991).
39. Id. The Court observed that "[e]qual protection analysis turns on the intended conse-
quences of government classifications. Unless the governmental actor adopted a criterion with the
intent of causing the impact asserted, that impact itself does not violate the principle of race-
neutrality." Id.
40. Id. at 1869 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986)).
41. Id. The Court also stated:
A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based
on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is
the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race
neutral.
Id. at 1866. Of course, appellate review on this factual question is very limited since "evaluation
of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies 'peculiarly within a trial
judge's province.'" id. at 1869 (citations omitted).
42. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992).
43. Id. at 2354-57. The Court found that: (1) the criminal defendant's discriminatory action
harmed the juror and the public's confidence in the jury system; (2) the defendant's exercise of a
peremptory challenge constituted state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause; and (3)
the state had third-party standing to challenge the defendant's action. Id.
44. Id. at 2359.
45. Id. at 2364 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also observed that:
In the interest of promoting the supposedly greater good of race relations in the soci-
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Just this term, the Court resolved yet another issue created by
Batson and its progeny. In J.E.B. v. State ex rel T.B.,48 which in-
volved a father's challenge to a state's elimination of men from ju-
ries in paternity actions, the Court prohibited gender-based peremp-
tory challenges. Since gender and race traditionally have been
evaluated by applying different levels of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause,4" the outcome of this case was uncertain."8
III. BATSON HAS NOT ACHIEVED ITS GOAL
Batson sought to increase public confidence and fairness in the
judicial system by eliminating the use of discriminatory peremptory
challenges." Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his concurring opinion
in Batson, cited alarming statistics which showed the flagrant mis-
use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors.50 In recent
years, several vivid examples of that misuse have led to race riots
and a great deal of public outrage;51 there is no question that the
ety as a whole (make no mistake that is what underlies all of this), we use the Consti-
tution to destroy the age-old right of criminal defendants to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges as they wish, to secure a jury that they consider fair.
Id. at 2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. J.E.B. v. State ex rel T.B., No. 92-1239, 1994 WL 132232, at *2 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1994).
This author endorsed extending Batson's protection to apply to gender in Morehead, Exploring
the Frontiers, supra note 6.
47. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that classifications based on gender receive a
lesser degree of scrutiny than those based on race). Gender discrimination is permitted only if it is
substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
48. Despite the appeal of the proposition that jury selection should be free from gender discrim-
ination, it is easy to imagine the practical problems of policing this expansion of Batson. Unlike
other protected classifications, everyone in the jury pool is subject to scrutiny now that all males
and females have been added to Batson's scope.
49. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986). The Court held: "In view of the heterogeneous
population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be
strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race." Id.;
see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (noting that jury integrity is imperiled
by laws encouraging public nonparticipation in the jury process).
50. Batson, 476 U.S. at 103-04 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall also cited an instruction
book used in Texas that advised prosecutors to eliminate any minority group member. Id. at 104
(citing VAN DYKE. supra note 3, at 152).
51. See William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the Patient, 104
SuP. CT, REV. 97, 153 (1987) (discussing the race protests and public outrage over two Florida
cases involving defendants acquitted by all-white juries after the defendants peremptorily struck
all the African-American venirepersons); Milo Geyelin & Martha Brannigan, Jury Selection in
Racially Charged Cases Becomes More Difficult After Rioting. WALL ST. J., May 5, 1992, at BI
(commenting on the riots after the first Rodney King verdict); Jack Reed, Miami Officer's Retrial
May Begin at Last, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at IB (quoting the trial judge's com-
ments on the retrial of Miami police officer William Lozano: "This court cannot ignore the na-
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turmoil in Los Angeles following the acquittal of the accused white
assailants of Rodney King was exacerbated by the fact that an all-
white Simi Valley jury decided their fate.52
Regrettably, the stereotypical attitudes that have guided the use
of the peremptory challenge have been difficult to change. 3 In 1936,
Clarence Darrow observed that "[t]he Irishman and the Jew, be-
cause of their national background, will put a greater burden on the
prosecution and prove more sympathetic and lenient to a defendant,
than an Englishman or a Scandinavian whose passion for the en-
forcement of the law and order is stronger." '54 Batson cannot secure
the guarantee of equality in jury selection because lawyers still har-
bor those same beliefs today. This fact was vividly demonstrated in
a comprehensive manual for defense attorneys, published in 1991:
Stereotypically, people from a Mediterranean population are considered de-
sirable as jurors for the plaintiff. Those of Italian, Spanish, and French de-
scent are thought to empathize more readily with the human and emotional
side of a lawsuit. Also, those of Slavic, Irish, and Mexican descent, as well
as American blacks, are thought to fall into this stereotypical category. Per-
sons of German, Scandinavian, Swedish, Finnish, Dutch, Nordic, Scottish,
Asiatic and Russian heritage tend to be stereotypically better for the crimi-
nal prosecution. Law and order is highly regarded among these groups. 55
Despite the Batson rule's noble purpose, it cannot prevent clever
lawyers from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors
based upon impermissible rationales so long as they pretend to use
other, permissible bases. Lawyers will continue to strike, with impu-
nity, potential jurors for any reason they please - religion, occu-
pancy, sexual orientation, body language, educational background,
or dress - even if the unstated reason is not permissible under
tional tragedy of the urban riots that followed the Rodney King verdict. . . . That so many of our
fellow Americans feel shut out from our judicial system demands our attention."); Jeffrey Rosen,
Jurymandering: A Case Against Peremptory Challenges, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 15
(reviewing the tensions created by racial exclusion in the first Rodney King trial in Simi Valley
and the Yankel Rosenbaum trial in Brooklyn); E. R. Shipp, Must a Jury of One's Peers Be a
Panel of One's Race?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1987, § 4, at 6 (commenting on the tensions created
by jury selection in the Howard Beach case).
52. The use of an all-white jury in the first Rodney King trial received heavy criticism. See,
e.g., Terry McMillan, This is America, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A4 ("I'm mad. Everybody
should be mad. How did this trial ever manage to take place before a jury with no blacks?").
53. Harris, supra note 6, at 1032. Harris observed that it "perpetuates invidious stereotypes, as
each party applies both limited knowledge of the jurors and generalizations shaped by experience
to eliminate jurors seemingly unsympathetic to a litigant." Id.
54. Rosen, supra note 51, at 16 (quoting Clarence Darrow).
55. Id. (citation omitted).
1994]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
Batson.56
The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointedly
explained the problem with enforcing Batson when he noted that
"[d]espite the facile lip-service generally paid to the above constitu-
tional principles, they are effectively nullified by evidentiary require-
ments that virtually insulate a prosecutor's use of the peremptory
challenge to exclude jurors."57 A recent survey of seventy-six cases
in the federal circuits found only three in which the attorneys' prof-
fered reasons were deemed unacceptable. 58  The following recent
cases from the Eighth, Ninth, and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal
illustrate this unfortunate point all too well.
In United States v. Sandoval,5 9 the Eighth Circuit upheld a pros-
ecutor's explanation for striking one of the two black jurors from
the panel because she was a cosmetologist, very youthful, and prob-
ably did not have a high level of education.60 Moreover, in Sando-
val, the trial judge interpreted Batson to permit race to be used as a
factor in peremptory challenges, so long as it is not the predominant
or controlling factor.6
In United States v. Lorenzo,62 the Ninth Circuit allowed the ex-
clusion of the last remaining potential juror with a Hawaiian or Pol-
ynesian surname from a case arising out of Hawaii, based on the
prosecutor's explanation that the juror had "long, unkept" hair, a
56. Id. Professor Susan Herman has noted that "[riequiring the prosecutor to articulate a race-
neutral reason for a peremptory challenge seems to allow the prosecutor to exclude a potential
juror partially on the basis of race - as long as the prosecutor can also articulate a race-neutral
reason." Herman, supra note 6, at 1830.
57. Pennsylvania v. Hardcastle, 546 A. 2d 1101, 1113 (Pa. 1988) (Nix, C.J., dissenting). The
Chief Justice, in advocating the end of peremptory strikes altogether, also noted:
Even if the defendant succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of such discrimina-
tion, the prosecutor can defeat the claim if the hearing court accepts his "neutral
explanation" for excluding jurors of the defendant's race .... The arbitrary nature of
the concept of peremptory challenges renders it impossible to effectively prevent its
use as a discriminatory tool.
Id. at 1113-14 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
58. Swift, supra note 6, at 358. "The lawyers' stated reasons for challenges in these seventy-six
cases focused consistently on certain qualities of potential jurors: prior involvement with the law,
prosecutorial intuition, body language and appearance, employment and residence, knowledge of
the defendant, and age." Id. at 359.
59. 997 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1993).
60. Id. at 491-92.
61. Id. at 492; see also Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 30 (1993) (holding that peremptory
jury strikes motivated only in part by race do not violate the Equal Protection Clause if the
prosecutor can sustain the burden of showing he would have exercised his peremptory challenge
for race-neutral reasons as well).
62. 995 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1993).
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"long" beard, and an appearance otherwise associated with the
counterculture beliefs of "hippies." 63 Despite expressing some reser-
vations about the government's attitude toward persons with long
hair and beards, the trial judge upheld the peremptory challenge."'
Perhaps the most glaring incident demonstrating the ease of side-
stepping Batson occurred recently in the Third Circuit in United
States v. Uwaezhoke. 5 In publishing an amazing colloquy between
the trial judge, the prosecutors, and the defense attorney, the court
of appeals upheld the use of a peremptory challenge against a black
female on the basis that she was a "postal worker," a "single par-
ent," and lived in "rental property" in the city of Newark. 6 The
appellate court conceded that, based on the information available to
the government, the juror was qualified to serve on the jury. 7 How-
ever, as the court noted, "that is not what peremptory challenges are
all about. ' 68 Because the court could not find intentional racial dis-
crimination when faced with the government's explanation, the pros-
ecutor's use of the peremptory challenge was upheld.6 9 The Third
Circuit conceded that the proffered explanation - that the juror
was a postal worker, single parent, and property renter - would
likely have a disparate impact on African-Americans in the
vicinity.70
63. Id. at 1454.
64. Id.
65. 995 F.2d 388 (3d. Cir. 1993).
66. Id. at 391. The appellate court found "that the government's explanation for excusing the
juror was not facially invalid as a matter of law, and that the district court was not clearly errone-
ous in finding an absence of actual discriminatory intent." Id.
67. Id. at 394 n.5.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Court observed:
While it is certainly conceivable, as [counsel for the defense] suggests, that the prose-
cutor took one look at [the juror's] color and thought, "Blacks who live in poor neigh-
borhoods cannot be trusted to fairly enforce drug laws against other blacks," it is
equally possible that the prosecutor concluded that anyone, regardless of color, who
lives in a poor neighborhood in Newark may have had personal experience with drug
trafficking that would make their reaction to trial evidence unpredictable.
Id.
70. Id. at 394-95. The dissent noted that 65.3 percent of Newark's postal workers were black
and that 58.5 percent of the city's population was black. Id. at 397, 400 (Pollack, J., dissenting).
The dissent argued that:
If the government's explanation, generally applied, would have a disparate impact on
a particular racial group, this fact should cause a trial judge to exercise special scru-
tiny during the third step of the Batson process to determine whether intentional dis-
crimination, as a matter of fact, underlies the government's peremptory challenge.
Id. at 401 (Pollack, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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In arguing against restricting peremptory challenges before Bat-
son was decided, a federal district court predicted that the foregoing
enforcement problems would emerge:
Most important of all, attorneys, confronted with a rule completely or par-
tially restricting their right to act with the internal motive of helping their
clients when making peremptory challenges, will be under enormous pres-
sure to lie regarding their motives. Such a rule will foster hypocrisy and
disrespect for our system of justice. Indeed, it is even possible that an attor-
ney may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are
legal.7
1
IV. THE COSTS OF BATSON ARE Too HIGH
Against these obvious practical shortcomings, the exact cost of
Batson in terms of judicial resources is difficult to measure. 2 Justice
Powell noted in Batson that where discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges had already been banned in state courts, those "courts [had]
not experienced serious administrative burdens. 73 Justice Powell's
claim, however, has been refuted in subsequent literature,7 4 and his
statement likely did not contemplate the extent of subsequent litiga-
tion needed to clarify the contours of the Court's equal protection
holding in Batson.75
Moreover, Batson by its very nature requires another level of voir
dire, both to defend and attack the use of peremptory challenges in
a given case.716 Assuming that counsel for both sides honestly intend
to abide by the holdings in Batson and its progeny, they nevertheless
must develop a record in voir dire to defend the peremptory chal-
lenges used against a claim of discrimination and a similar record to
argue that the peremptory challenges were racially motivated. This
fact led Chief Justice Burger to argue in his dissent from the Batson
majority that the holding would imprint "racial differentiation" on
71. Pizzi, supra note 51, at 141 (quoting King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 501-02
(E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
72. Id. at 140.
73. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
74. Pizzi, supra note 51, at 140-41.
75. Justice Scalia has noted that the amount of time that judges and lawyers devote to imple-
menting the Batson rule is enormous. He suggested in Edmonson "[tihat time will be diverted
from other matters, and the overall system of justice will certainly suffer," and he conceded that
one alternative would be for the states and Congress to simply eliminate peremptory challenges
altogether. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2096 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
76. Pizzi, supra note 51, at 140.
[Vol. 43:625
1994] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
voir dire, because the parties would develop evidence to support
their claims by asking jurors to state their race and national origin,
even if those questions were personally offensive to the jurors.77
As voir dire has become more and more time-consuming and ex-
pensive, Batson has posed additional problems for a judicial system
that many believe is already close to a breakdown. 8 Indeed, at a
recent meeting of over 100 lawyers and judges, one of the special
areas discussed was the burgeoning problem of voir dire.79 Some
participants called for a time limit of fifteen to twenty minutes on
the examination of prospective jurors, to be expanded only in ex-
traordinary circumstances. 80 One Massachusetts judge estimated
that in his state, where there is a backlog of 60,000 civil and 6,000
criminal cases, superior court judges devote more time to voir dire
in one year than three trial judges spend on their entire caseload
during that same timespan.8 1 And, of course, in the more celebrated
cases, the time allotted for picking a jury can amount to several
weeks. 2
77. Batson, 476 U.S. at 129 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
78. See Deborah Marchini, Trial by Jury, the Crisis in the Courts, CNN INSIDE Bus., Apr. 25,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File. She stated:
Funding cuts and rising caseloads are delaying justice around the country, and it's
going to get worse. . . .If you file a civil case in Philadelphia, it may take five years
to come to trial. Delays like those are just one reason the American Bar Association
recently concluded that the justice system in many parts of the U.S. is, in its words,
on the verge of collapse, and it's having a serious impact on businesses and individuals
around the nation.
Id. R. William Ide, President of the American Bar Association, recently observed that "[wie need
a revolution to take place" and that, "[flrom a national perspective, the court system is too expen-
sive, too slow and not accessible enough. We are facing a justice system crisis of epic proportions."
Bill Rankin, New ABA Chief Calls for Change, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 7, 1993, at B4.
79. Thomas Scheffey, Making the Law A Better Workplace, CONN. L. TRIB., March 22, 1993,
at 19.
80. Id.
81. Barbara Rabinovitz, Lawyer-conducted Voir Dire Encored, MAss. LAW. WKLY., July 22,
1991, at I. In that same article, Superior Court Judge Roger J. Donahue challenged the legiti-
macy of voir dire by questioning the motives of the trial attorneys: "This idea that they want an
impartial jury, that's a farce. . . .What trial lawyer wants an impartial jury? He wants to win.
He's not in the business for justice; he's in the business to make money." Id.
82. For example, in the Reginald Denny case - which involved the trucker beaten by rioters
during the 1992 Los Angeles riots - the trial began on July 28, 1993. Events in the Reginald
Denny Beating Case, S.F. CHRON.. Oct. 19, 1993, at A6. Jury selection, however, was not com-
pleted until two weeks later. Racially Mixed Jury Picked in Denny Beating Trial, Reuters, Aug.
12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
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V. CURTAILING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES Is NECESSARY
The decision in Batson symbolized a momentous alteration of the
role of the peremptory challenge in jury trials."3 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed that the right to use peremptory challenges is not of con-
stitutional magnitude and may be withheld altogether without af-
fecting the parties' right to a fair trial."' Legislative bodies author-
ize the number of peremptory challenges, and the limits placed on
them in both criminal and civil cases;85 hence, peremptory chal-
lenges are used only when the government decides it is appropriate
for parties to exclude otherwise qualified individuals from jury
service.86
Since peremptory challenges are not required by law, Justice
Marshall, in his concurring opinion in Batson, proposed complete
elimination of these challenges to remove discrimination from the
jury selection process.8 Relying on Justice Arthur Goldberg's ear-
lier dissent in Swain v. Alabama,88 Justice Marshall argued that,
given a choice between preserving peremptory challenges or ensur-
ing that a jury is selected in conformity with the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Constitution requires choosing the latter.89 Mar-
shall did not believe that Batson's rule would work because it leaves
lawyers free to discriminate when using peremptory challenges, pro-
vided the action is not flagrant. 90 He accurately predicted that trial
courts will be "ill equipped to second-guess" the reasons offered by
the lawyer.91
83. Swift, Note, supra note 6, at 353.
84. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., I ll S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991); Gray v. Miss., 481 U.S.
648, 663 (1987); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S.
497, 505 n.l 1 (1948); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
85. Edmonson, I II S. Ct. at 2083.
86. Id.
87. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). At the other end
of the ideological spectrum, Justice Scalia has argued that peremptory challenges were practically
eliminated anyway when the Court decided Batson and its progeny and held that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause applies to the striking of individual jurors. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 419-26
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
89. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall questioned:
How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the
juror had a son about the same age as defendant, . . . or seemed "uncommunicative,"
• . . or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities neces-
sary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in this case" . . .?
Id. (citations omitted).
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When contrasted with what has happened since Batson, Mar-
shall's call for the end of peremptory challenges is an attractive
one.92 First, it would eliminate the continued litigation pressures
that Batson has placed on both trial and appellate courts. Trial
courts would no longer be placed in the difficult posture of subjec-
tively evaluating the hidden motives of attorneys in using peremp-
tory strikes. Appellate courts, in turn, would not have to review
those cases nor consider the endless permutations of Batson con-
stantly proposed by litigants.93
Moreover, the elimination of peremptory challenges would reduce
the need for extensive voir dire or the gathering of large jury panels
for routine cases.94 The plain truth is that a truly random selection
of juries is far more representative of the population than the cur-
rent system.95 Questions about religious preferences, attitudes about
particular institutions, or political views that have crept into voir
dire could be eliminated with ease. 96 While empirical studies show
that these personal and social characteristics have little impact on
jury verdicts, lawyers continue to devote a great deal of time to
92. By adopting Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Batson, the Supreme Court could
eliminate the use of peremptory challenges in order to safeguard a defendant's right to equal
protection under the law. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring). Eliminating or
reducing the number of peremptory challenges through rule or legislative changes, of course,
would face a more dubious future. In 1976, the Supreme Court proposed a reduction in the num-
ber of peremptory challenges in felony cases from six to five for prosecutors, and from ten to five
for defense attorneys. H.R. Doc. No. 94-464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976). The proposal, how-
ever, was opposed by the powerful lobby of trial lawyers and ultimately rejected by Congress. Act
of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 2(c), 91 Stat. 319.
93. At oral argument in J.E.B., the state of Alabama suggested that eliminating peremptory
challenges altogether may be the best way to comply with a decision by the Supreme Court to
extend Batson to apply to a gender-based discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. J.E.B. v.
State ex rel T.B., 62 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1993).
94. Pizzi, supra note 51, at 145.
95. Editorial, Jury Selection - Peremptory Challenges Should Be Thrown Out, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 5, 1992, at A9. The editorial contended that:
Legal counsel, particularly prosecutors, seemed very eager to dismiss jurors who pos-
sess the following qualifications: 1) They answer questions clearly and honestly; 2)
They are thinking people, professionals, managers, writers and teachers; 3) They are
civic minded or politically active; 4) They have opinions and can express themselves;
and 5) They are not intimidated if their views do not agree with the views of others.
These same prosecutors consider the ideal juror, on the other hand, to be one who
possesses the following traits: 1) Does not read much, 2) Does not watch TV news, 3)
Has few strong opinions, and 4) Is a team player and goes with the flow.
Id.
96. The curtailment of peremptory challenges also would eliminate the need for costly jury
consultants during voir dire. Gay Jervey, The Seer, AM. LAW., June, 1993, at 56.
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them because of the peremptory challenge. 7 The system would be
able to handle more trials more efficiently if the questions focused
entirely on matters supporting a challenge for cause - that is, a
challenge based on a "narrowly specified, provable and legally cog-
nizable basis of partiality." 98
Of course, one of the greatest dangers posed by the elimination of
peremptory challenges is the possibility that a disruptive person -
at one extreme - would be selected to a jury and distort the case to
favor one side or the other.99 Eliminating the safety valve that pe-
remptory challenges provide against this sort of "unlucky" roll of
the dice in jury selection cannot be dismissed out-of-hand. °° Due to
the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment, a prosecutor
without a peremptory challenge would be particularly vulnerable to
a trial judge who improperly fails to remove a biased juror for
cause. Nonetheless, these speculative concerns are inherently unper-
suasive when compared to the need to achieve fairness in jury selec-
tion. As Justice Powell noted, "[I]t is the jury that is a criminal
defendant's fundamental 'protection of life and liberty against race
or color prejudice.' "101 That shield remains at risk so long as pe-
remptory challenges are permitted to survive as part of the jury se-
lection process.
Of course, one modest concession to the foregoing concerns might
be to preserve in each case one or two peremptory challenges for
each side.'02 The problem with even this concession, however, is that
where minority representation is slight, the use of the one or two
remaining peremptory challenges could perpetuate the complete ex-
clusion of protected groups from juries. °3 Expanding challenges for
cause to include biases inferred from statements that seem to indi-
cate a prejudice toward one side of the case might prove to be the
97. See RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 41 (1980) (reviewing this
research).
98. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
99. Pizzi, supra note 51, at 145-46.
100. Id. at 146.
101. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 309 (1880)).
102. A reduction in the number of peremptory challenges - rather than an outright ban -
would mirror the approach followed in England. See Pizzi, supra note 51, at 147-49 (discussing
England's reduction in the number of peremptory challenges).
103. "The problem is that in a diverse society, the peremptory challenge is actually a stacking
tool that favors majority interests while handicapping the party who would benefit from minority
representation on the jury." Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to
Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REv. 781, 800 (1986).
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safer approach in addressing this concern. TM
CONCLUSION
The exercise of the peremptory challenge has been altered over
time because of the unfairness resulting from its use. The time has
now come to eliminate it altogether in both criminal and civil trials.
There is no constitutional right to use such challenges, and they pro-
vide tremendous opportunities for widespread abuse. The important
goal of Batson - to achieve the end of discrimination in jury selec-
tion - has not been accomplished. That aspiration is too important
to be conceded in favor of a current system that perpetuates dis-
crimination. Although the Supreme Court has used high-minded
rhetoric to defend peremptory challenges as a method of assuring a
fair trial, the test of time indicates that such challenges continue to
be used as the ultimate weapon to alter the outcome of a case by
allowing the subtle use of discrimination. It is now time for the
Court to take the final step and eliminate peremptory challenges
altogether.
104. Bray, Comment, supra note 6, at 557.
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